S503

An Act concerning criminal homicide and amending various parts of the statutory law.

Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:

2C:11-3. Murder.

a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape [or], terrorism [pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2)], or stalking, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury..

b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

(2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.

(3) A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:

(a) The victim is less than 18 years old; and

(b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.

(4) Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison, if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following aggravating factors exist:

(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;

(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;

(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;

(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;

(e) The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;

(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;

(g) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9;

(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;

(i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;

(j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;

(k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or

(l) The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).

(5) A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.

c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

f. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

h. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.

(cf: P.L.2017, c.150, s.1)

2. N.J.S.A.2C:11-4 is amended to read as follows:

2C:11-4. Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when:

(1) The actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; [or]

(2) The actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle; or

(3) The actor causes the death of another person in the course of stalking that person in violation of section 1 of P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10).

b. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(1) It is committed recklessly; or

(2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under N.J.S.2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.

The discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the homicide victim's actual or perceived gender identity or expression, or affectional or sexual orientation, which occurred under any circumstances, including but not limited to circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the actor, or if the victim and actor dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship, shall not be reasonable provocation pursuant to this paragraph. As used herein, the terms "gender identity or expression" and "affectional or sexual orientation" shall have the same meaning as in section 5 of P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-5).

c. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.

(cf: P.L.2019, c.468, s.1)

3. N.J.S.2C:11-5 is amended to read as follows:

2C:11-5. Death by auto or vessel.

a. Criminal homicide constitutes reckless vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

(1) Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

(2) Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

(3) Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

(4) Proof that the defendant failed to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88 may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

(5) Proof that the defendant committed stalking pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10) against the victim of the criminal homicide may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

b. Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection, reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.

(1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.

(2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.

(3) Reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(4) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.

(5) Reckless Vehicular homicide is a crime of the third degree if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not commit any conduct constituting driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly other than failing to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88.

c. For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.

d. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.

As used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

e. Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this Title.

(cf: P.L.2017, c.372,, s.1)

4. N.J.S.2C:44-1 is amended to read as follows:

2C:44-1. a. In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been convicted of an offense, the court shall consider the following aggravating circumstances:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor in committing the offense, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner;

(2) The gravity and seriousness of harm inflicted on the victim, including whether or not the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance;

(3) The risk that the defendant will commit another offense;

(4) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's offense because it involved a breach of the public trust under chapters 27 and 30 of this title, or the defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense;

(5) There is a substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity;

(6) The extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted;

(7) The defendant committed the offense pursuant to an agreement to either pay or be paid for the commission of the offense and the pecuniary incentive was beyond that inherent in the offense itself;

(8) The defendant committed the offense against a police or other law enforcement officer, correctional employee or firefighter, acting in the performance of the officer, employee, or firefighter duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority; the defendant committed the offense because of the status of the victim as a public servant; the defendant committed the offense against a sports official, athletic coach or manager, acting in or immediately following the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a sports official, coach or manager; or the defendant committed the offense against any health care professional, volunteer working for a health care professional or working at a health care facility, supportive services staff member working for a health care professional or working at a health care facility, or employee of a health care professional or health care facility, while the health care professional, volunteer, supportive services staff member, or employee is performing official duties.

For the purposes of this paragraph, "health care facility" and "health care professional" mean the same as those terms are defined in subsection b. of section 3 of P.L.2023, c.48 (C.2C:12-3.1);

(9) The need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law;

(10) The offense involved fraudulent or deceptive practices committed against any department or division of State government;

(11) The imposition of a fine, penalty, or order of restitution without also imposing a term of imprisonment would be perceived by the defendant or others merely as part of the cost of doing business, or as an acceptable contingent business or operating expense associated with the initial decision to resort to unlawful practices;

(12) The defendant committed the offense against a person who the defendant knew or should have known was 60 years of age or older, or disabled;

(13) The defendant, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom, used or was in possession of a stolen motor vehicle;

(14) The offense involved an act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), committed in the presence of a child under 16 years of age; [and]

(15) The offense involved an act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19) and the defendant committed at least one act of domestic violence on more than one occasion; and

(16) The offense involved the crime of stalking pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10), or the victim of the offense was previously a victim of stalking by the defendant pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1992, c.209 (C.2C:12-10).

b. In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been convicted of an offense, the court may properly consider the following mitigating circumstances:

(1) The defendant's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm;

(2) The defendant did not contemplate that the defendant's conduct would cause or threaten serious harm;

(3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;

(4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a defense;

(5) The victim of the defendant's conduct induced or facilitated its commission;

(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of the defendant's conduct for the damage or injury that the victim sustained, or will participate in a program of community service;

(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense;

(8) The defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;

(9) The character and attitude of the defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense;

(10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;

(11) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant's dependents;

(12) The willingness of the defendant to cooperate with law enforcement authorities;

(13) The conduct of a youthful defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the defendant; and

(14) The defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

c. (1) A plea of guilty by a defendant or failure to so plead shall not be considered in withholding or imposing a sentence of imprisonment.

(2) When imposing a sentence of imprisonment the court shall consider the defendant's eligibility for release under the law governing parole, including time credits awarded pursuant to Title 30 of the Revised Statutes, in determining the appropriate term of imprisonment.

d. Presumption of imprisonment. The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime of the first or second degree, or a crime of the third degree where the court finds that the aggravating factor in paragraph (5), (14), or (15) of subsection a. of this section applies, by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that the defendant's imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection e. of this section, the court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of theft of a motor vehicle or of the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and who has previously been convicted of either offense by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.

e. The court shall deal with a person convicted of an offense other than a crime of the first or second degree, who has not previously been convicted of an offense, without imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public under the criteria set forth in subsection a. of this section, except that this subsection shall not apply if the court finds that the aggravating factor in paragraph (5), (14) or (15) of subsection a. of this section applies or if the person is convicted of any of the following crimes of the third degree: theft of a motor vehicle; unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; eluding; strict liability vehicular homicide pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3); if the person is convicted of a crime of the third degree constituting use of a false government document in violation of subsection c. of section 1 of P.L.1983, c.565 (C.2C:21-2.1); if the person is convicted of a crime of the third degree constituting distribution, manufacture or possession of an item containing personal identifying information in violation of subsection b. of section 6 of P.L.2003, c.184 (C.2C:21-17.3); if the person is convicted of a crime of the third or fourth degree constituting bias intimidation in violation of N.J.S.2C:16-1; if the person is convicted of a crime of the third degree under paragraph (12) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1 or section 2 of P.L.1997, c.111 (C.2C:12-1.1); or if the person is convicted of a crime of the third or fourth degree under the provisions of section 1 or 2 of P.L.2007, c.341 (C.2C:33-29 or C.2C:33-30).

f. Presumptive Sentences. (1) Except for the crime of murder, unless the preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors, as set forth in subsections a. and b. of this section, weighs in favor of a higher or lower term within the limits provided in N.J.S.2C:43-6, when a court determines that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted, it shall impose sentence as follows:

(a) To a term of 20 years for aggravated manslaughter or kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:13-1 when the offense constitutes a crime of the first degree;

(b) Except as provided in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph to a term of 15 years for a crime of the first degree;

(d) To a term of four years for a crime of the third degree; and

(e) To a term of nine months for a crime of the fourth degree.

In imposing a minimum term pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, the sentencing court shall specifically place on the record the aggravating factors set forth in this section which justify the imposition of a minimum term.

Unless the preponderance of mitigating factors set forth in subsection b. weighs in favor of a lower term within the limits authorized, sentences imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 shall have a presumptive term of life imprisonment. Unless the preponderance of aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in subsections a. and b. of this section weighs in favor of a higher or lower term within the limits authorized, sentences imposed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 shall have a presumptive term of 50 years' imprisonment; sentences imposed pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 shall have a presumptive term of 15 years' imprisonment; and sentences imposed pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-7 shall have a presumptive term of seven years' imprisonment.

In imposing a minimum term pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-7, the sentencing court shall specifically place on the record the aggravating factors set forth in this section which justify the imposition of a minimum term.

(2) In cases of convictions for crimes of the first or second degree where the court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence the defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. If the court does impose sentence pursuant to this paragraph, or if the court imposes a noncustodial or probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the first or second degree, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of the sentence by the prosecution.

g. Imposition of Noncustodial Sentences in Certain Cases. If the court, in considering the aggravating factors set forth in subsection a. of this section, finds the aggravating factor in paragraph (2), (5), (10), or (12) of subsection a. of this section and does not impose a custodial sentence, the court shall specifically place on the record the mitigating factors which justify the imposition of a noncustodial sentence.

h. Except as provided in section 2 of P.L.1993, c.123 (C.2C:43-11), the presumption of imprisonment as provided in subsection d. of this section shall not preclude the admission of a person to the Intensive Supervision Program, established pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.

(cf: P.L.2023, c.48, s.2)

5. This act shall take effect on the 90^th day following enactment.

STATEMENT

This bill provides that a person who has committed stalking may also be guilty of criminal homicide against the victim under certain circumstances. Additionally, the bill provides that if a defendant convicted of any offense also committed stalking against the victim, the stalking would constitute an aggravating factor in sentencing.

Felony Murder. The bill makes it felony murder, a crime of the first degree, if the defendant was engaged in the commission of, an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit stalking and in the course of that crime or of the immediate flight therefrom, any person caused the death of any other person other than one of the participants. Under current law, a person is guilty of felony murder under these circumstances if the person was engaged in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape, or terrorism. A defendant convicted of the first degree crime of felony murder will be sentenced to a term of 30 years, during which the defendant is not eligible for parole, or to a specific term between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the defendant must serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

Aggravated Manslaughter. Under the bill, a person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter, a crime of the first degree, if the person caused the death of another in the course of stalking that person. Under current law, a person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter under two circumstances: (1) if the person recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, in which case the person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 to 30 years; or (2) if the person causes the death of another while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, in which case the person is sentenced pursuant to the ordinary sentencing for a crime of the first degree: a term of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years, a fine of up to $200,000, or both. Under the third circumstance added by the bill, the defendant would be subject to the ordinary sentencing for a crime of the first degree.

Death by Auto. Under current law, a person is guilty of reckless vehicular homicide, known as death by auto, when a homicide is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly. The bill provides that proof that the defendant committed stalking against the victim of the criminal homicide may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

Aggravating Factor in Sentencing. Finally, the bill adds stalking as an aggravating factor in sentencing a person convicted of any offense. Under current law, the court is required to consider 15 different aggravating factors in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who has been convicted of an offense. The bill would add a 16th aggravating factor, requiring the court to also consider that the offense involved the crime of stalking or that the victim of the offense was previously a victim of stalking by the defendant.